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On Being Morally Expendable 
Inevitably, assessing the moral 
value of life seems to leave us stuck 
between a rock and a hard place. If 
we hold that life is intrinsically valua­
ble, that commits us to respecting 
plants and paramecia as ends in them­
selves and to explaining how the 
change from organic to inorganic is in 
and of itself a moral loss. That evalu­
ation seems exaggerated, and who 
knows how even to begin to explain 
the intrinsic moral superiority of the 
organic to the inorganic! On the 
other hand, if life is valuable only as 
a necessary condition for other, mor­
ally significant goods, such as happi­
ness or conscientious action, it follows 
that the taking of life is morally sig­
nificant only where it affects the 
amou nt of or opportu n ities for these 
goods. This conclusion is objection­
able because it seems to leave the 
individual's life morally insignificant 
and unprotected: as long as he will be 
replaced by an (at least) equally 
happy or conscientious individual 
when he is killed, it would seem to be 
morally indifferent whether he is 
allowed to continue his life or whether 
he is killed and replaced. 
Since I agree that the rock is a 
rock--that is, I know of no reason to 
believe that the organic· is in and of 
itself morally more valuable than the 
inorganic--the point of this paper will 
be to show that the hard place is 
softer than it looks. To do this I 
want, first, briefly to indicate how 
limited the practical consequences of 
the replaceability argument are. 1 
Then, on the theoretical side, I want 
to show that the replaceability argu­
ment does not work from all standard, 
general moral viewpoi nts and that an 
argument recently put forward by 
Peter Singer, among others, to the 
effect that utilitarians must accept the 
replaceabil ity argument is fallacious. 
Thus, the point of this paper is not 
to prove that the replaceability argu­
ment commits some logical blunder', for 
it does not; rather, the main point of 
this paper is that the replaceability 
argument requi res certai n presump­
tions concerning moral worth, that not 
all credible, general moral viewpoints 
make the required assumptions, and 
that there are even credible forms of 
utilitarianism which do not make the 
requi red assumptions. Consequently, 
even if we agree that life is morally 
valuable only as a necessary condition 
for other goods, we are not stuck 
with the replaceability argument. 
Fi rst of a II, even those of us who 
work in the clouds should be aware 
that just about the only current, rou­
ti ne ki lIing of an imals wh ich the 
replaceability argument would even be 
relevant to justifying is that involved 
in the taking of some animals bred, 
raised, and more or less relea::;ed to 
be game animals. The replar~eability
argument cannot be used to justify 
the killing of wild animals,. because by 
and large (i) they would have existed 
whether or not we had an interest in 
killing them, (ii) we do not do any­
thing to replace the ones we kill, and 
(iii) it is not necessary that the wild 
animals we kill die in order that the 
ones which replace them might live. 
Nor can the replaceability argument be 
used to justify the killing of most 
domesticated animals or animals bred 
and raised in captivity, e. g., for lab­
oratory use. This is because most of 
these animals do not lead a life worth 
living. Even when not in pain, most 
animals raised for slaughter or bred 
for laboratory use lead frustrated, 
boring lives which fall far short of 
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the quality of life which gives being 
alive its moral value. Consequently, 
although the replaceability argument 
provides an intriguing puzzle for 
moral philosophers to ponder, it is of 
little to no consequence as a justifica­
tion for our current treatment of ani­
mals. 
Turning to the puzzle, its solution 
depends on two things: what is the 
good that gives moral value to life, 
and what is the relation of individual­
ity to that good?2 Rather than try to 
resolve long-standing moral disputes 
in order to answer the first of these 
questions, I propose simply to layout 
six more or less standard answers to 
that question. I shall then consider 
how important or unimportant individ­
uality is from each of these six moral 
viewpoints. 
The first two of these viewpoints 
concern autonomy and the belief that 
autonomy merits our respect. Kant 
argued that autonomous individuals 
should be treated as ends in them­
selves because autonomy is a neces­
sary condition for the possibility of 
morality. 3 The idea here is that since 
morality is intrinsically good, the 
source of morality should be respected 
as an intrinsic good. So, as long as 
an individual capable of right and 
wrong is innocent of crime, he has 
earned our unqualified respect. 
The second autonomy-based moral 
viewpoint I wish to consider is of 
more \'ecent vintage and is summarized 
in ths popular slogan "we don't have 
a ri3ht to force our values onto oth­
ers. " The idea here is that if an 
individual is capable of valuing things 
for himself, then he should be allowed 
to do so and to pursue his own values 
(as long as doing so is not unfairly 
injurious to other independent 
valuers). This idea of autonomy, 
i.e., being an independent source of 
evaluations, differs from the Kantian 
concflption of autonomy as the ability 
to recognize moral values. 
That independent valuers should be 
respected has been a fundamental 
presumption of many natural rights 
and egoistic moral philosophies, and it 
has become particularly important in 
recent work in medical ethics, where 
it underlies many arguments for 
patients' rights. This moral outlook 
was also adopted by Tom Regan in a 
recent argument concerning animal 
rights: . 
The suggestion before us, 
then, is that all but the i rre­
versibly comatose have inher­
ent value because all these 
humans have a life which is of 
more or less positive or neg­
ative value for them, and this 
logically independently of 
whether they (the humans in 
question) are valued by anyone 
else. Here, therefore, we 
have a way of illuminating why 
it would be wrong to treat 
these humans merely as a 
means. This would be wrong 
because it would fail to 
acknowledge and respect the 
fact that they are the subjects 
of a life whose value is logic­
ally independent of any other 
being's taking an interest in 
it. Thus, in treating these 
humans merely as means one 
treats them as if their value 
was logically dependent on 
their answering to the needs, 
purposes, etc., of others, 
when in fact, they, as the 
subjects of a more or less good 
life, have value that is logic­
ally independent of their being 
valued as a means by anyone 
else. 4 
I have yet to see a convincing defense 
of the idea that because an individual 
is capable of making his own evalua­
tions we ought to permit him to do 
so--although some defense in terms of 
the "do only that which you can will 
as a universal law" form of the 
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categorical imperative seems possible­
but its wide acceptance in current 
moral philosophy, both professional 
and popular, seems beyond question. s 
I. shall label the fi rst of these 
autonomy-based moral outlooks "the 
Kantian-autonomy view" and the sec­
ond variety "the independent-valuer 
. " view. 
The remaining four moral outlooks 
on what gives life value are all forms 
of utilitarianism. I propose, following 
Peter Singer here, to divide utilitari­
anism into classical vs. preference 
theories and total view vs. prior 
existence theories. 6 Classical utilita­
rianism commands us to do that which 
will maximize happiness, while prefer­
ence utilitarianism commands us to do 
that which will accord, as far as pos­
sible, with the preferences of those to 
be affected by ou r action. These two 
forms of utilitarianism are different 
because individuals may not (e.g., 
due to ignorance) prefer that which 
would maximize happiness and because 
one may prefer something (e.g., life) 
the loss of which would not occasion 
unpleasant feelings. The total view 
form of utilitarianism commands us to 
maximize the amount of utilitarian good 
in the world, while the prior existence 
view commands us to maximize that 
good for the beings already in the 
world. The difference between these 
two forms of utilitarianism is that the 
former, but not the latter, requi res 
direct concern for the preferences or 
happiness of unborn individuals or 
generations. On the prior existence 
view, the futu re interests of the 
unborn may have to be taken into 
account, but only insofar as the pros­
pect of thei r fu Ifi IIment or fru stration 
affects the preferences or happiness 
of cu rrently existing individuals. 
Combining these two distinctions 
yields four versions of utilitarianism: 
the preference-total view, the prefer­
ence-prior existence view, the 
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classical-prior existence view, and the 
classical-total view. 
Now, how does individuality fare 
when measured by these six different 
ways of establishing moral value? 
From the Kantian-autonomy perspec­
tive, the only forms of life which 
merit our moral respect are those 
which are capable of moral action, and 
individuals with this capacity merit 
our respect so long as they are inno­
cent of cr.ime. The Kantian imperative 
to treat no man as a means merely is 
not a command to maximize the· number 
of conscientious agents in the world; 
rather, it asserts that those with the 
capacity for recognizing and doing 
right and wrong (and who are in no­
cent of wrong) thereby merit ou r 
respect. In the case of individuals 
who have had the opportunity to do 
wrong but have not done so--which is 
the paradigm case here--this expres­
sion of good moral cha racter may be 
said to have "earned" these individu­
als our respect. Just as a hard 
worker has earned his wage, so some­
one of good moral character has 
earned the right to be happy, and in 
this world, at least, others must 
respect the moral individual's desires, 
wants, needs, etc., and his attempts 
to fulfill them, if he is to achieve the 
happiness to which he is entitled. 
Among these needs (as fa r as we 
know), is the need to be alive in 
order to experience happiness. So, 
although killing one individal of good 
moral character (or with the capacity 
for it) and replacing him with another 
(e. g., slaying one normal human 
infant and replacing it with another) 
would not reduce the amount of 
(capacity for) good moral character in 
the world, it would deprive the slain 
individual of what he is due on the 
basis of his (capacity for) good moral 
character. Thus, the Kantian-Cluton­
omy view protects the individual 
against the replaceability argument 
because it commands us to respect the 
right to happiness of those with the 
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capacity to recognize and act on moral 
values, while slaying such an individ­
ual would (for all we know) deprive 
him of that to which he is entitled. 
It may be thought that all this is 
irrelevant to the matter at hand, the 
moral permissibility of killing and 
replacing non-human animals, since 
Kant held that only those who can act 
from a sense of duty can have good 
moral character, that only rational 
beings can act from a sense of duty, 
and that only humans are rational ani­
mals. While this is true of Immanuel 
Kant, it need not be true of the Kan­
tian-autonomy position. Some philoso­
phers, such as David Hume, have 
argued that some non-human animals 
are rational, and others, such as 
Richard Watson, have argued that 
some non-human animals are capable of 
acting out of a sense of duty 7. Fu r­
thermore, one can combine the view 
that individuals of good moral charac­
ter have earned our respect with 
non-Kantian theories of good moral 
character, e.g., Hume's idea of virtue 
arising from a strong sense of sympa­
thy. I believe most people, philoso­
phers included, would reject Kant's 
claim that acting from a sense of duty 
is the only morally estimable motive. 
Most of us credit generous sentiments 
as' a morally worthy motive. However, 
acknowledging the moral significance 
of sympathy and other generous sen­
timents opens the door wide to argu­
ing that many non-human animals who 
intentionally and sincerely do morally 
good deeds, or who a re at least in no­
cent of crime, have earned ou r 
respect for their lives on Kantian-au­
tonomy grounds. 8 Consequently, 
these animals could not be killed and 
replaced, according to the Kantian­
autonomy view. 
Turning to the independent valuer 
view, it holds that we should respect 
all individuals capable of forming their 
own values. There are two points 
that need to be clarified in order to 
discuss this position: what counts as 
making one's own values, and, correl­
atively, how are we to tell if others 
are (capable of) doing this? Some phi­
losophers, such as Ruth Cigman in 
her recent article, "Death, Misfor­
tune, and Species Inequality," make 
of valuing a fairly abstract, inten­
tional, conceptual process of which 
preference behavior does not provide 
significant evidence: 
To be a possible subject of 
misfortunes which are not 
merely unpleasant experiences, 
one must be able to desi re and 
value certain things. The 
kind of misfortune which is in 
question here is death, and to 
discover whether this is a mis­
fortune for an animal, we must 
ask whether, or in what sense, 
animals don't want to die. Of 
course, in some sense this is 
true of virtually all animals, 
which manifest acute fear when 
thei r lives are th reatened. 
Yet blindly clinging on to life 
is not the same as wanting to 
live because one values life. 
This is the kind of desire for 
life of which persons are capa­
ble. It is this which gives 
sense to the claim that death is 
a misfortune, even a tragedy, 
for a person. 8 
For philosophers like Cigman, linguis­
tic ability is necessary both for being 
able to rna ke one's own evaluations 
and for communicating to others that 
one has this capacity. 
This position has the virtue of 
avoiding the opposite extreme of say­
ing that plants which turn their 
leaves to follow the sun are making 
their own evaluations and showing this 
to us. However, it seems arbitrary to 
cut off valuing at some fairly intellec­
tual level. Infants, children, ·and 
many animals seem obviously capable 
of being happy or unhappy and to 
prefer, want, desire, grab for, pur­
sue, or "value" those things which 
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bring them the former. Also, we can 
usually tell what infants, children, 
and animals want without being told; 
we need only to watch their course of 
action. Thus, our everyday dealings 
with infants, children, and animals 
suggest that being a sentient agent, 
rather than having linguistic ability, 
is what is necessary for being (and 
for being recognized as being) an 
independent eval uator. The bu rden 
of pl"oof is on those who would deny 
this conclusion--and that burden can­
not be met by a stipulative definition. 
It follows from the independent 
evaluator viewpoint that we should 
(other things being equal) respect the 
values and pursuits of all sentient 
agents. Since they cannot pursue 
their values unless they are alive and 
since another, replacement individual 
would pursue his own values, rather 
than those of the individual he· 
replaces, it also follows that the inde­
pendent evaluator view protects many 
animals against the replaceability 
argument. Let me emphasize that the 
individual need not directly value life 
itself (whatever that may mean) in 
order to have his life protected by 
the independent evaluator view. What 
individual X values is not, for exam­
ple, just lying in the sun. What he 
values is his lying in the sun--this 
may be clearly evidenced by his chas­
ing away other individuals already 
lying in the sun, so that he may take 
their place. Individual Y, brought in 
to replace the slain X, will not, of 
course, value X's lying in the sun; he 
will value his own (Y's) lying in the 
sun. So, replacing X with Y will not 
provide an adequate foundation for 
the continued pursuit of what X val­
ued, even where X did not directly 
value his own life. Consequently, for 
a sentient agent's values and pursuits 
to be respected, his life must be 
respected, whether or not he ever 
contemplates that life and values it 
directly. 
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Thus, both autonomy-based moral 
viewpoints deny that it is morally 
permissible (in many cases) to kill an 
animal and replace it with a similar 
animal. Either such killing and 
replacing would deny the animal of 
good moral character the respect it 
has earned, or it would deny the sen­
tient agent the respect due the pu r­
suit of his independe·nt values. 
Turning to the utilitarian options, 
the preference-total view option main­
tains that we should do that which 
will accord (as far as possible) with 
the preferences of those cu rrently 
alive and the likely preferences of 
futu re individuals and generations. 
Here, once again, we must deal with 
the psychological and epistemological 
issues of what counts as having a 
preference (or being capable of hav­
ing preferences) and how we are to 
know when others have preferences 
(or are capable of having prefer­
ences) . 
As valuing has sometimes been 
made out to be an intellectual activity, 
so preferring is sometimes made out to 
be an activity requiring self-contem­
plation and the projection and analysis 
of futu re alternatives. For example, 
Peter Singer writes: 
A being which cannot see itself 
as an entity with a future can­
not have a preference about its 
own future existence. This is 
not to deny that such a being 
might struggle against a situ­
ation in which its life is in 
danger, as a fish struggles to 
get free of the barbed hook in 
its mouth; but this indicates 
no more than a preference for 
the cessation of a state of 
affai rs that is perceived as 
painful or th reatening. Strug­
gle against danger and pain 
does not suggest that the fish 
is capable of preferring its 
own future existence to non­
existence. 10 
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Immediately, one may wonder how a 
being that cannot see itself as a being 
with a future could possibly perceive 
a state of affairs to be "threatening" 
or could possibly struggle against 
"danger". Singer's attempt both to 
acknowledge obvious value expressing 
behaviors of an imals yet to deny that 
they have preferences seems to be 
self-contradictory. 
Fu rthermore, desi ri ng seems to be 
a paradigm of preferring, 11 yet desir­
ing requires neither reflective self­
consciousness nor great intellectual 
ability. 12 Furthermore, it would be 
reasonable to expect that all sentient 
beings, no matter how limited their 
self-con scious ness, intellect, and 
sense of time, would have prefer­
ences. There would be no evolution­
ary point to their being sentient if 
they could not recognize, desire, and 
pursue those things which give them 
pleasure and recognize, desire to 
avoid, and seek to avoid those things 
which give them pain. 
When it is maintained that few, if 
any, animals can have preferences, 
because they cannot see themselves as 
entities with a future, it is presumed 
that self-consciousness and having a 
sense of the future are confined to 
self-contemplation and to having a 
sense of the indefinite expanse of time 
awaiting us. However, in addition to 
self-contemplation, there is the sen­
sory self-consciousness involved in 
feeling pleasure and pain and the 
practical consciousness of oneself as 
an agent in the world, having a "lived 
body" of powers at his command, 
needs to be met, and vulnerabilities to 
be protected. 13 Being .an agent also 
requires having a sense of the 
future--which, let us not forget, 
though it may extend indefinitely, 
begins immediately. This is because 
agency requires recognizing that one 
thing will lead to another, e.g., that 
jf one goes to the back of the house 
and pushes on the pet door, then he 
will be able to get out of the house. 
Self-consciou s/ non -self-conscious and 
aware of the future/unaware of the 
future are not in the same set with 
pregnant/not pregnant; there are 
various forms and degrees of self­
consciousness and awareness of the 
future, and these varieties give rise 
to varying capabilities for having 
preferences. 
Again, when it is denied that ani­
mals can have a preference for life, it 
is presumed that to prefer life 
requires contemplating an indefinite 
future existence. But why should 
"preferring" X require that we con­
template X when the question of X is 
not raised by the environment? Can­
not one "prefer" X and show others 
that he prefers X if, whenever his 
environment raises the issue of X, he 
pursues X (other things being equal)? 
It does not seem to do harm to the 
logic of "preferring" to say that an 
animal who acts to preserve his life 
when it is threatened prefers to 
remain al ive and is amply demonstrat­
ing his preference. Many animals 
even seem to experience and deal with 
the conflict of desires which some 
philosophers might want to insist is 
essential to the logic of "preferri ng"; 
e. g., when faced with danger to thei r 
young or group, many animals seem 
both to want to flee and to feel they 
must stay and defend their young or 
group. Perhaps humans are the only 
animals ·who are morbid enough to 
contemplate life and death when that 
issue is not forced upon them, but 
preferring life to death does not 
require such morbid fascination. Just 
as was the case with self-conscious­
ness and a sense of the future, pre­
ferring comes in a variety of forms 
and degrees, and it is arbitrary to 
consider only the intellectual extreme 
of that variety when making moral 
judgments. 
When trying to figure out what will 
best accord with the preferences of 
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those who will likely be affected by 
ou r action, we must recogn ize that 
many animals are, like children, 
desiring, sentient agents, even if 
they are not self-contemplative 
beings. Their behavior can make 
their desires known to us, and among 
these desires will ordinarily be a 
desire not to be killed. Also, even if 
the animal is not aware that his long 
term existence is required to fulfill 
some of his desires, e.g., the raising 
of his young, his remaining alive for 
a long period of time may be neces­
sary for fulfilling those preferences; 
consequently, doing what accords with 
those preferences req uires respecti ng 
the animal's life. Furthermore, among 
the animal's current desires will ordi­
narily be a number which are essen­
tially self-centered, e.g., his contin­
uing to lie in the sun, which will 
remain frustrated even if the animal 
were replaced by another an imal with 
similar preferences. Thus, the killing 
of a non-self-contemplative animal and 
replaci ng it with another is a morally 
significant act from the preference-to­
tal view utilitarian viewpoint. 
Whether such killing and replacing 
is morally permissible remains u nde­
cided, however, and that is true 
whether we are dealing with animals 
or with humans. The self-contem­
plative individual does have an advan­
tage, for he may prefer not to worry 
about his being slain and replaced 
while his demise is still a long way 
off, whereas the non-self-contem­
plative individual can have no such 
worry; he can on Iy prefer not to be 
killed, and that only when the time of 
slaughter is close at hand. However, 
if the possibility of long-range fore­
knowledge of slaughter could be elimi­
nated, merely a technological problem 
which some science fiction writers 
have al ready resolved, then the per­
missibility of slaughter and replace­
ment would be the same for both 
humans and animals on preference-to­
tal view util ita rian g rou nds. 14 
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Whether or not long-range 
foreknowledge is involved, the direct 
moral significance of killing humans or 
animals is that it will frustrate some 
of their preferences. However, if the 
slain are replaced, their demise will 
also permit the fulfillment of the pref­
erences of the replacement individuals 
(which would, by hypothesis, not be 
possible without the slaughter of the 
others). It follows (neglecting indi­
rect issues) that if individuals were 
slaughtered when half the preferences 
that could be fulfilled in their lives 
have been fulfilled and were replaced 
with individuals having similar life 
expectancies, that would accord with 
the preferences of the born and the 
unborn just as well as allowing the 
original individuals to live out the 
second half of their lives. 15 Also, if 
the number of an individual's prefer­
ences that cou Id be satisfied ina year 
was the same throughout his life, then 
slaughter and replacement at any time 
in his life would be permissible, and 
if the number of possible fulfillments 
were higher in earlier years than in 
later years, it would even be prefera­
ble to slaughter an older individual 
and replace him with a younger one, 
rather than allowing the old individual 
to live out his life. Thus, if we 
could compute the rate of fulfillment 
of preferences, preference-total view 
utilitarianism could sanction the 
slaughter and replacement of animals 
and humans. 
Moving on, we may deal with both 
the preference-prior existence and the 
classical-prior existence forms of util­
itarianism at one stroke. Both of 
these views limit direct moral concern 
to currently existing individuals, the 
former to according with their prefer­
ences, the latter to maximizing their 
happiness. This clearly rules out the 
replaceability argument. That argu­
ment presumes that the future prefer­
ences or happi ness of the unborn can 
be used as a substitute for the losses 
suffered by the slain; however, 
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insisting that our direct moral obliga­
tions are limited to currently existing 
individuals denies direct moral signifi­
cance to the future preferences and 
happiness of the unborn and, 
thereby, denies that the latter can be 
morally equated with the former. So, 
any prior existence moral outlook will 
protect the individual against the 
replaceability argument. 
Turning to classical-total view util­
itarianism, it requires us to do that 
which will maximize the amount of 
happiness in the world. From this 
viewpoint, killing, even painlessly, is 
a morally significant act, for it elimi­
nates the possibility of the future 
happiness of the slain (assuming that 
the futu re held happiness for the 
slain individual and that death does 
not lead to a happier form of exis­
tence than continuing life would 
have) ~ However, if another individual 
with simila r prospects for the futu re 
is substituted for the slain individual 
(and would be brought into existence 
only if the other were slain), then the 
balance of happiness in the world is 
unaffected. Consequently, classical­
total view utilitarianism provides moral 
significance for life but does not pro­
vide any protection for the individual 
against the replaceability argument. 
The individual is merely a receptacle 
for happiness; so, as long as there is 
a ready supply of receptacles to 
replace the broken ones, nothing 
important will be lost through the 
breakage. 
Once again, this conclusion applies 
to humans as well as to animals. If 
humans are not distressed by fore­
knowledge of their impending slaugh­
ter and replaclement (because the 
practice is hidden from them) or if 
they have al ready enjoyed half the 
happiness thei r lives cou Id provide or 
if happiness in later years is suffi­
ciently less than in earlier years to 
counterbalance the depression caused 
by knowing that one is to be slain 
and replaced by a youngster, then 
classical-total view utilitarianism could 
not only permit but even require the 
slaughter and replacement of humans. 
Since humans have greater ability to 
foresee their slaughter and replace­
ment than do animals, there would be 
greater technological problems in 
applying the replaceability argument 
to humans than to animals. However, 
humans' extensive foresight provides 
no more fu ndamental an obstacle to 
slaughter and replacement on classi­
cal-total view utilitarian grounds than 
does the limited foresight of animals. 
The only differences here are the 
details of implementation. 
Once it has been argued, as it was 
above, that animals have preferences, 
it can be seen that the difference 
between preference and classical forms 
of utilitarianism is not important where 
the question is the permissibility of 
slaughter and replacement. Whether 
one is dealing with humans or animals 
and with happiness or preferences, 
the crucial issue is whether a total 
view or a prior existence view will be 
adopted. This conclusion naturally 
leads to the question, if we are going 
to be utilitarians, is there some rea­
son wh ich impels us to be total view 
rather than prior existence utilitari­
ans? That total view utilitarianism 
could, while prior existence utilitari­
anism could not, sanction the slaugh­
ter and replacement of humans would, 
in the eyes of most people, philoso­
phers included, put the burden of 
proof on the shoulders of the total 
view. Also, as Peter Singer points 
out, total view utilitarianism has the 
counterintuitive consequence that it 
requires us to bring as many happy 
individuals into the world as possible. 
It follows that a couple whose happi­
ness· (or preferences) wou Id be com­
promised by a smaller amou nt than the 
happiness (or fulfilled preferences) 
awaiting a child they could have would 
be under a moral obligation to have 
that child. 16 Prior existence 
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utilitarianism leads to no such conse­
quence. 
However, Peter Singer also argues 
that prior existence utilitarianism 
leads to another, equally counterintui­
tive conclusion: 
How do we square prior exis­
tence utilitarianism . with our 
intu itions about the case when 
a couple are considering hav­
i ng a ch i1d who, perh aps 
because it will inherit a genetic 
defect, would lead a thor­
oughly miserable life and die 
before its second birthday? 
We would think it wrong for a 
couple knowingly to conceive 
such a child. 17 
Singer goes on to provide the follow­
ing resolution for this problem but 
also indicates that he finds this ans­
wer ins ufficient: 
Perhaps the best one can 
say--and it is not very good-is 
that there is nothing directly 
wrong in conceiving a child 
who will be miserable, but once 
such a child exists, since its 
life can contain nothing but 
misery, we would reduce the 
amount of pain in the world by 
an act of euthanasia. But 
euthanasia is a more harrowing 
process for the pa rents and 
others involved than non-con­
ception. Hence we have an 
indirect reason for not con­
ceiving a child bound to have 
a miserable existence. 18 
I would agree that this indirect­
wrong answer does not provide an 
adequate response to the problem 
Singer has raised for prior existence 
utilitarianism. However, I think the 
following can be added to provide an 
adequate response to this problem. 
Regarding the matter of our intuitions 
concerning this case, I am not sure 
we have any, for this is an utterly 
fantastic case. Cases somewhat Ii ke it 
do occu r, but they a re cases where 
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there IS a statistically significant 
chance that a couple's infant will 
inherit a debilitating disease or defect 
and, of course, a statistically signifi­
cant chance that it will not. In these 
cases I do not find there is a well-es­
tablished intuition that it would be 
wrong for couples to consider con­
ceiving children, especially if they 
were prepared to abort a fetus dis­
covered to have in herited the debili­
tating disease or defect. Similarly, 
we encou nter cases of people whose 
children will likely (or even almost 
certainly) inherit their defects, e.g., 
retardation or blindness, and will, 
consequently, be condemned to leading 
a life we would not find satisfying. 
However, those people may fi nd that 
life satisfying and, consequently, feel 
they are not bringing misery into the 
world by having children. Again, it 
is not intuitively obvious they are 
wrong. 
In contrast to such real cases, 
Singer's case verges on being incon­
ceivable. Somehow, the couple must 
know with virtual certainty that their 
prospective child will inherit a disease 
which will make its life undeniably 
miserable and kill it before the age of 
two. Fu rthermore, th is couple must 
be so desperate to conceive thei r own 
child, that they would rather bring 
this monstrosity into the world· and 
care for it 19 than adopt a child. I 
doubt that such people and such a 
case exist, and I do not think that 
the acceptability of moral principles 
hinges on their ability or inability to 
handle such unheard of cases. 
But if such people did exist, they 
would have a perverted idea of repro­
ducing and parenting and would show, 
by keeping the child alive for its two 
miserable years, their willingness to 
use others merely as means to their 
own happi ness. Consequently, th is 
whole project of parenting would 
express a kind of demented character 
which would give the project a strong 
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immoral value. I think this bad-char­
acter evaluation accounts for one idea 
that, presume, Singer intended to 
suggest with this case, viz., that 
there would be something demented, 
perverse, selfish, or morally insensi­
tive involved in bringing a miserable 
child into the world or even in just 
seriously contemplating doing so. 
Prior existence utilitarianism can 
account for this intuition, since this 
is an evaluation of character, and 
prior existence utilitarianism no more 
precludes making character evaluations 
than does total view utilitarianism. 
In discussing bringing a miserable 
child into the world, it is easy to 
lump together th ree stages of the 
process which a re importantly differ­
ent in their moral value: 
(i) intending to conceive such a 
child, 
(ii) conceiVing such a child, and 
(iii) keeping such a child alive. 
As just discussed, (i) is a bizarre 
project and expresses bad moral char­
acter, if the prospective parents 
intend to keep the child alive. If, 
however, they intend to abort the 
potentially miserable child before it 
develops sufficiently to suffer, then 
thei r intention is to satisfy· thei r 
bizarre compulsion to conceive in a 
way which does no direct harm from 
any utilitarian viewpoint. Far from 
being wrong, such a project would be 
morally praiseworthy, for it (a) shows 
tolerance for unusual psychological 
needs, (b) expresses, in its willing­
ness to sacrifice the pre-sentient 
fetus, a commitment to the idea that it 
is not species membersh ip but the 
capacity to feel pleasure and pain (or 
to have preferences) which makes a 
being morally significant in itself, and 
(c) reponsibly projects a course of 
action which will satisfy the bizarre 
needs of the couple without causing 
.harm to or frustrating the preferences 
of anyone else. Thus, on utilitarian 
grounds, "considering having a miser­
able child" is not obviously wrong, 
and prior existence utilitarianism can 
acommodate the character evaluations 
which are involved in morally evaluat­
i ng (i). 
Turning to (ii), if we set aside the 
pleasure involved and issues such as 
rape, it is morally neutral. There is 
nothing directly either morally right 
or morally wrong with conceiving a 
child which, if it is allowed to 
develop, will lead a thoroughly miser­
able life. Conceiving such a child 
could be wrong for the indirect rea­
sons Singer notes, i.e., aborting the 
pre-sentient fetus could be more dis­
tu rbi ng for the couple (and others, 
too, perhaps) than not conceiving at 
all, but conceiving such a child could 
also be morally justifiable if the suf-, 
feri ng associated with. abortion were 
less than the frustration of not con­
ceiving or if, as suggested above, the 
production of such a fetus were nec­
essary for medical progress. Addi­
tionally, conceivi ng a potentially mis­
erable child is like the moderate use 
of alcohol or other potentially debili­
tating drugs: by itself it is either 
morally innocuous or morally positive, 
due to the immediate satisfaction it 
provides; it becomes morally objec­
tionable only if it is allowed to lead to 
consequences whose disval ue out­
weighs that immediate satisfaction. As 
long as one takes steps to insure that 
these adverse consequences will not 
occur, there is nothing directly wr~>ng
with such indulgences in the poten­
tially harmful. 
Finally, allowing a thoroughly and 
incurably miserable child to continue 
to suffer seems clearly immoral. Only 
the possibility of thereby making a 
great contribution to easing the suf­
fering of others would justify keeping 
such a child alive. Satisfying the 
compulsion of the parents to have a 
living product of their own loins pales 
by comparison with the misery of such 
an infant. However, prior existence 
utilitarianism has no problem 
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accounting for this evaluation of (iii), 
for at this stage the suffering child is 
an existing, sentient being. So, at 
the stage where we intuitively feel 
that a wrong is being done to the 
suffering child, prior existence utili­
tarianims also finds that, ceteris pari­
bus, having, i.e., keeping, such a 
chi Idis w ro ng . 
Considering having a child who will 
be miserable if it is allowed to live 
and even conceiVing such a child do 
not bring misery into the world. Mis­
ery is brought into the world only 
when that ch iId has developed to the 
point where it can suffer and when it 
is allowed to continue to live and suf­
fer. I think Singer believes his case 
poses a problem for prior existence 
utilitarianism because he does not 
clearly distinguish intention, concep­
tion, and maintenance and, conse­
quentiy, transfers the intuitively neg­
ative moral evaluation of the third of 
these stages back to the earlier two 
stages. However, once we clea rly 
distingu ish these th ree stages, we can 
see that this case does not pose a 
problem for prior existence utilitarian­
ism, since "bringing a miserable life 
into the world" refers to actualizing 
(or allowing to start operating) the 
capacity to suffer of an already exist­
ing individual. The difference 
between bringing a miserable life into 
the world and bringing misery into a 
life seems to be limited to the fact 
that in the latter case the individual's 
capacity to feel pleasure and pain (or 
to have fulfilled or frustrated prefer­
ences) has already been operating for 
a while, while in the former case we 
are considering its initial actualiza­
tion. Since in either case the indi­
vidual already exists, this difference 
does not constitute a difficulty for 
prior existence utilitarianism. 
Finally, Singer maintains that to be 
satisfactory, prior existence utilitari­
anism would have to explain the fol­
lowing asymmetry: 
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if the pleasure a possible child 
will have is not a reason for 
bringing it into the world, why 
is the pain a possible child will 
experience a reason against 
bringing it into the world? 
The prior existence view must 
explain the asymmetry between 
cases of possible children who 
are likely to have pleasant 
lives, and possible children 
who are likely to have misera­
20ble lives. D 
However, there is no need for such 
an explanation, for there is no asym­
metry here. The possible happy life 
of a normal child and the possible 
miserable life of a deformed child 
become reasons for having, i. e., 
keeping, the normal child and not 
having, i.e., aborting, the deformed 
child only when the child is already in 
existence and its capacity for happi­
ness or misery is ready to be actual­
ized. At that stage the obligation to 
keep the normal child is as strong (on 
either classical or preference utilita­
rian grounds) as the obligation to 
abort the deformed ch ild. Simiia rly, 
seriously considering conceiving and 
maintaining an assuredly miserable 
child is ordinarily an expression of 
bad moral character, while seriously 
considering conceiving and maintaining 
a normal child is ordinarily an 
expression of good, i. e., responsible, 
generous, or loving, character. 21 
The actual conceiving of either child 
is, of course, in itself just pleasant 
(ceteris paribus). So, at each stage 
there is symmetry in our evaluations 
concerning parenting a normal child 
and parenting a miserable one. 
would guess that Singer believes there 
is an asymmetry here because he is 
comparing our obligation (given cur­
rent liberal intuitions) to abort an 
already existing, though not yet sen­
tient, seriously deformed ch iId with 
our lack of obligation (again, given 
cu rrent liberal intuitions) to conceive 
normal children. But once again, if 
we clearly distinguish intention, 
I 
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conception, and maintenance, the sup­
posed obstacle to accepting prior 
existence utilitarianism disappears. 
To sum up this discussion of Sing­
er's objection to prior existence utilit­
arianism, first, that objection is based 
on a fantastic possibility, and it is at 
least not obvious that the fate of 
moral theories hinges on their ability 
or inability to handle the fantastic. 
Second, what would be demented or 
perverse in the project of pa renti ng 
Singer describes is the character of 
the prospective parents, and prior 
existence utilitarianism has no more 
difficulty making character evaluations 
than does total view utilitarianism. 
Third, if we clearly distinguish the 
three stages of the project--consider­
ing having a miserable child, conceiv­
ing such a child, and keeping the 
child--it becomes clear that there is a 
definite, direct, moral wrong only at 
the third stage, but since the child 
already exists at that stage, prior 
existence utilitarianism has no diffi­
culty accounting for that wrong. 
Finally, prior existence utilitarianism 
does not require any asymmetry in the 
criteria employed in determining our 
obligations concerning having or not 
having normal or miserable children. 
Thus, Singer's challenge to prior 
existence utilitarianism has been met. 
(And the strategy employed here does 
not suggest that a similar response to 
his challenge to total view utilitarian­
ism could be made--here there is an 
asymmetry. ) 
There is one other objection to 
prior existence utilitarianism which 
might be raised, namely, that it wou Id 
rule out obligations to futu re genera­
tion s. One cou Id, of cou rse, have 
obi igations to respect how cu rrently 
existing people (and animals?) feel 
about the Iife prospects of futu re 
generations, but since they do not 
exist, we could not have direct obli­
gations to them. This might seem a 
serious problem, for the idea of ou r 
obligations to futu re generations seems 
to be a fai rly common one and has 
achieved some currency in environ­
mental ethics. Nonetheless, I thin k 
the prior existence view is correct: 
we do not have obligations to future 
generations. And recognizing this 
need not pose an obstacle for the 
development of an effective envi ron­
mental ethics. 
On any given day, our obligation 
to do that which will maximize the 
long-range happiness or accord with 
the long- range preferences of those 
currently alive commits us to looking 
seventy-five to one hundred years 
into the future. 22 I doubt that we 
are capable of making significant pro­
jections of use patterns, preferences, 
technological developments, and other 
important matters concerning the 
quality of life more than seventy-five 
to one hundred years into the future. 
So, if we insure that our environmen­
tally significant practices will not lead 
us (humans and animals) to be dissat­
isfied with the quality of life available 
to us seventy-five to one hund red 
years hence, I think we will be doing 
the best we can. Also, let us not 
forget that every time a decision must 
be made about maintaining, altering, 
or abandoning a program, that deci­
sion wou Id have to be based on a 
consideration of what would be best 
for the seventy-five to one hundred 
years stretching into the future from 
that date. Consequently, foregoing 
the idea of direct obligations to future 
generations would not cripple environ­
mental ethics. 
To summarize, four of the six 
moral theories considered here extend 
moral value to life in a way which 
protects individual humans and animals 
from the replaceability argument. The 
on Iy moral theories considered here 
which provide no such protection are 
the two forms of total view utilitarian­
ism. However, total view utilitarian­
ism would sanction the replaceability 
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of humans, as well as of animals, and 
would obligate us to have as many 
children and to breed as many animals 
as the ea rth can support without 
diminishing the over-all happiness (or 
fulfillment) in the world. The other 
fou r moral theories considered here do 
not encounter these difficulties. So, 
if these other theories do not fall 
prey to other, more serious difficul­
ties--and we have seen that some pro­
posed objections to prior existence 
utilitarianism fail--there would seem to 
be ample, animal-independent reason 
for even utilitarians to reject total 
view utilitarianism, thereby undercut­
ting the replaceability argument. 
Therefore, from a theoretical, as well 
as a practical, perspective, the 
replaceability argument does not pose 
a serious obstacle to the development 
of animal rights and other attempts to 
improve the moral status and the lives 
of animals. 
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Notes� 
By "the replaceability argument," 
I understand the formu lation of it 
found in the March, 1982, issue of 
Ethics 8- Animals (111/1, p. 1) : 
It is permissible, ceteris pari­
bus, to use an animal and to 
kill it (for food or research or 
anything else) provided that 
the following conditions are 
met. 
(a) the life of the animal is 
on balance a life worth live, 
(b) the animal otherwise 
would have no life at all 
(would not exist), and 
(c) the animal will be 
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replaced, at or after death, by 
another animal in the case of 
wh ich conditions (a) and (b) 
hold. 
(It is to be understood, of course, 
that if there are differences of degree 
among lives which are on balance 
worth living, then the life of the life 
of the replacement animal is to be of a 
least as high a degree as that of the 
animal it replaces.) 
2 By "individuality" I do not mean 
anything having to do with the qual­
ity, natu re, or complexity of different 
personalities or characters. I mean 
simply the "thisness," as Duns Scotus 
called it, wh ich quantitatively sepa­
rates us as different beings. 
3 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis 
White Beck (I ndianapolis: The Library 
of Liberal Arts, 1959), pp. 46-47 
4 Tom Regan, "An Examination and 
Defense of One Argument Concerning 
Animal Rights," Inquiry 22/1 &2 
(1979), pp. 208-209. T. L. S. 
Sprigge also uses this argument to 
advocate animal rights in his essay 
"Metaphysics, Physicalism, and Animal 
Rights," Inquiry 22/1 &2 (1979), pp. 
101-143. 
5 Regan's "illumination" of why it is 
wrong to treat independent valuers 
merely as means is vitiated by his 
uncritically lumping acknowledging and 
respecti ng that independence- -a su r­
prising lapse from a philosopher who 
is usually meticulous in drawing and 
observing distinctions. If I guard, 
chain, or cage slaves or animals to 
keep them from escaping my control, 
thereby acknowledge that they place a 
different value on their lives and con­
ditions than I do. I even "respect" 
thei r val ues in the pragmatic way one 
"respects" the power of and danger 
posed by an adversa ry, although I do 
not "respect" their evaluations of 
thei r Iives and conditions in the moral 
I 
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sense of the term; that is, I do not 
honor those evaluations, treat them as 
a basis for rights, consider them to 
constitute justified claims to something 
and against me, or feel duty bound 
not to interfere with responsible 
attempts to fulfill those values. Such 
lack of moral respect does not commit 
the faux pas of denying what these 
individuals in fact are, i.e., indepen­
dent valuers; it merely indicates that 
I am willing to deny these individuals 
the satisfaction of their desires, 
needs, wants, etc., in order to sat­
isfy my own. So, Regan's analysis 
does not show why this attitude 
towards others is morally objection­
able. 
6 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), Chapters 4 and 5. 
7 David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, Part III, Section xvi, and 
Richard A. Watson, "Consciousness 
and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals 
and Natu re," Environmental Ethics 1/2 
(1979). 
8 S. F. Sapontzis, "Are Animals 
Moral Beings?," American Philosophical 
Quarterly 17/1 (1980). 
9 Philosophy & Public Affairs 10/1 
(1981), p. 57. 
10 Practical Ethics, p. 81. 
11 Of course, one may desire some­
thing yet prefer that it not happen, 
as when one's desires conflict with his 
moral commitments. However, failing 
such conflicts, to desire X is to pre­
fer that it occu r. We wou Id suspect 
that some stipulative definition is at 
work, if we hea rd someone say some­
thing like "I desire X and feel no 
conflicting desires or values, yet I do 
not prefer that X occu r. " 
12 In Interests and Rights (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1980), R. G. Frey 
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contends that desiring requires lin­
guistic ability, for (i) desiring X 
requires believing that we do not cur­
rently have X and that having X 
would improve our condtion and (ii) 
believing requires linguistic ability 
because 
[in] expressions of the form 
"He believes that . ," what 
follows the "that" is a sentence 
and what the "he" in question 
bel ieves is that that sentence 
is true (87) 
and 
sentences are the sorts of 
things which I and others 
regard as capable of being 
true and false (89). 
However, that sentences and beliefs 
a re both capable of bei ng true or 
false no more establishes a dependence 
of the latter on the former than the 
fact that automobiles and evening 
gowns can both be red establishes 
that the latter require the former. 
Similarly, that the object of a belief 
statement is a sentence no more 
establishes that the object of a belief 
is a sentence than the fact that the 
object of vision is expressed by a 
word in "I saw john"J  establishes that 
the object of perception is a word. 
When I am th irsty, the object of my 
desire and of my beliefs about what I 
lack and what would improve my con­
dition is something to drink, not a 
sentence about something to drink. 
No amount of grammatical analysis will 
change that. And an analysis of how 
we talk about interests, desires, and 
beliefs is no substitute for an analysis 
of interests, desires, and beliefs 
themselves, which is why Frey's book 
fails to show that animals lack inter­
ests, desires, or beliefs because of 
thei r lack of linguistic ability. 
13 Jean-Paulj  Sartre, The Transcen­
dence of the Ego (New York: The 
Noonday Press, 1957), and Maurice 
Merleau - Ponty, Phenomenology of Per­
ception (New York: Humanities Press, 
1962) . 
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14 In. "Singer on Killing and the 
Preference for Life" (Inquiry 22/1 &2 
(1979), pp. 157-170), Michael Lock­-
wood also questions whether prefer­-
ence utilitarianism draws a significant 
distinction between humans and ani­-
mals in regard to the morality of kill­-
ing and replacing them. 
15 Something like Bentham's catego­-
ries for measuring pleasures, e.g., 
intensity, du ration, and extent, wou ld 
have to be devised for measuring 
preferences, since not all preferences 
are equally preferred. 
16 Practical Ethics, pp. 86-87. 
17 Ibid., p. 87. 
18 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
19 If the child is not allowed to 
develop to the point where it will 
experience pain or other miseries, 
then there is no harm. However, it 
is even harder to conceive of people 
who are so desperate to conceive a 
child that they would do so knowing 
full well that the fetus will be aborted 
before the end of the fi rst trimester. 
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The only faintly realistic possiblity of 
th is I can image is where the aborted 
fetus would be crucial for research 
toward curing the debilitating disease 
or birth defect. However, in that 
case, far from doing wrong, the 
couple could be considered self-sacri­-
ficing, even heroic. 
20 Practical Ethics, p. 87. 
21 This is not to say that not con­-
sidering or considering not having 
normal children is ordinarily an 
expression of bad moral character- -al­-
though, contrary to Singer's intui­-
tions, that would be a fairly tradi­-
tional evaluation. 
22 The seventy-five year figure is 
close to correct if we use average 
human life expectancy as our basis; 
the one hundred year figure is cor­-
rect if we use the normal maximum 
human life expectancy as our basis, 
since every human generation seems to 
produce some centena rians. What the 
correct figures would be if we 
included animals, as we should, in 
figuring the average or normal maxi­-
mum life expectancy, I do not know. 
